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CASE COMMENTS
car for his master, the very same negligence must be imputed
in an action against a third party.'8
This author suggests that the rights and liabilities of a master should
be no more nor less than if he were merely a passenger.' 9
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, however, has
adhered to the majority rule despite its shortcomings. In Divita v.
Atlantic Trucking Co.,20 the court stated that since it was undis-
puted that the servant was acting for and in behalf of the master
plaintiff at the time of the accident, any contributory acts of the
servant were imputable to the master-plaintiff.
Although the decision of the Minnesota court rejecting such a rule
was limited to automobile cases in which the plaintiff was the
master, the decision may be indicative of a future trend in dis-
carding the general theory of imputed negligence. However, as
was indicated in the court's opinion, they may continue to be a
minority of one.
William Douglass Goodwin
Trusts-Power of Revocation-Various Methods
Decedent prior to death executed two written trust agreements on
bank accounts whereby the decedent was named trustee of the
separate accounts and certain beneficiaries were designated. The
trusts were, by express terms, declared to be revocable. Subsequent-
ly, decedent executed a will in which she specifically bequeathed
the bank accounts to persons other than the beneficiaries under
the trust agreements. The lower court held that the two bank
accounts were revocable declarations of trust, not tentative or Totten
trusts, and that the will did not revoke such trusts. HELD, affirmed.
Where a depositor sets up bank accounts in his own name as
trustee by means of written agreements specifically stated to be
revocable, such trusts are absolute inter vivos trusts, not Totten
trusts, and unless the power to revoke by will is specifically
1 Lessler, The Proposed Discard of the Doctrine of Imputed Contributory
Negligen ce 20 FonDH L. REv. 156 (1951).
2 Ibid.°Divita v. Atlantic Trucking Co. 129 W. Va. 284, 40 S.E. 324 (1946).
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reserved, the subsequent disposition of the accounts by will is
ineffective. Estate of Anderson, 217 N.E.2d 444 (Ill. 1966).
Where a trust is created by a written instrument the settlor has
the power to revoke the trust only if he has reserved that power
in the trust instrument.' There are several different methods of
exercising this power of revocation. The general rule regarding
these various methods of revoking trust instruments are stated by
Professor Scott to be, "Where the settlor reserves the right to revoke
the trust under certain circumstances, he can revoke it only under
those circumstances."2 Within this general rule there are four
situations more often presented to the courts for judicial solution.
The first of these occurs when the settlor makes a broad state-
ment reserving the power to revoke without specifying the manner
or means to effect such revocation. In such a situation the majority
of courts hold that a trust containing a general power of revocation
can be revoked only by an act taking effect during the lifetime
of the settlor.3 Under this rationale an attempted revocation by
will fails.
4
On the other hand, the settlor may provide the trust can be
revoked only by will. When these facts are present a general devise
of the settlor's estate will not operate to revoke the trust unless the
settlor clearly demonstrates an intention to revoke in his will.'
The reservation of the power of revocation for life precludes a
revocation by will, the theory being that since a will speaks at
death, the execution of a will revoking a trust during the settlor's
lifetime constitutes merely an intent to revoke at some future time.6
Finally, the settlor may provide for the revocation of the trust by
means of a written instrument delivered to the trustee or other
designated person. The courts generally hold that such instrument
must be written and delivered during the settlor's life, and that
'Peoples Natl Bank v. Pedes, 229 S.C. 167, 92 S.E.2d 163 (1958);
Restatement (Second), Trusts § 330 (1959); Contra, CAL. Crvn. CoDE§ 2280.
2 3 Scor, ,TRUSTS § 9.14 (2d ed. 1956).
3 Dickersons Appeal, 115 Pa. 198, 8 AUt. 64 (1887); Merchants Nat'l
Bank v. Weinold, 22 III. App.2d 219, 160 N.E.2d 174 (1959).4 Ridge v. Bright, 244 N.C. 345, 93 S.E.2d 607 (1965).
5 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Gardner, 264 Mass. 68, 161 N.E. 801 (1928).
6 Brown v. International Trust Co., 130 Colo. 543, 278 P.2d 581 (1954).
Leahy v. Old Colony Trust Co., 326 Mass. 49, 93 N.E.2d 238 (1950).
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an attempted revocation by will is ineffective.7 In this area there
is some doubt whether the written instrument required can be
provided by the settlors delivering his will during his lifetime. One
court expressly left this point undecided.' and in another case the
will was said to be effective as a written instrument if delivered
before the settlor's death.' In the latter case, however, the settlor
had provided for revocation by will in addition to revocation by
written instrument. Where the will is not delivered until after the
death of the settlor it is well settled that any attempted revocation
by will is ineffective, even though the will directs such delivery.'
A further means of revocation is by the insertion of a clause in
the trust instrument which reserves to the settlor, as trustee, the
unrestrained right to invade the trust corpus. He is given the right
as trustee to sell, redeem, exchange or otherwise deal with the trust
corpus, and upon sale or redemption the trust shall be terminated as
to the corpus sold or redeemed and the proceeds of such sale or
redemeption shall go to the settlor's own personal account." In
other words, the settlor may remove assets at his own discretion and
the trust is effectively revoked with respect to that portion of the
corpus withdrawn.
Although trusts containing such a clause have been challenged
as illusory'2 and testamentary in contravention of the Statute of
Wills,'3 the majority of the courts have held that the right to invade
corpus, even where the settlor is both the trustee and the life
beneficiary, will not render the trust invalid.'4 The rationale of the
courts when upholding trusts containing the reservation of rights
over the corpus which would seem tantamount to ownership is
twofold.
7Gal v. Union Nat'l Bank, 203 Ark. 1000, 159 S.W.2d 757 (1942); Cohn
v. Central Natl Bank, 191 Va. 12, 60 S.E.2d 30 (1950); In Re Lachlan's
Trust, 24 Misc.2d 323, 193 N.Y.S.2d 408 (1959).8 Union Trust Co. v. Watson, 76 R.I. 223, 68 A.2d 916 (1949).
9 First Nat'l Bank v. Oppenheimer, 230 Ohio P. Ct. 19, 190 N.E.2d
70 (1963).
"0 In Re Lon's Estate, 164 Pa. Super 140, 63 A.2d 415 (1949)., IInvestors Stock Fund, Inc. v. Roberts 179 F.Supp 185 (1959), af'd
286 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1961); Farkas v. Williams, 5 Ill.2d 417, 125 N.E.2d
600 (1955); Ridge v. Bright, 244 N.C. 345, 93 S.E.2d 607 (1956). See
generally Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 1270 (1958).
12lbid. See also, Smyth v. Cleveland Trust Co., 172 Ohio St. 489, 179
N.E. 2d 60 (1961).
13 Roberts v. Roberts, 286 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1961).
14 1 BoGanr, TRusvs AND TRuSTES § 104 (2d ed. 1962).
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First, in answer to the argument that the transfer is illusory, the
statement is made that the trust will be valid as long as the settlor
has relinquished some incidents of ownership. Where the settlor
is bound by the terms of the trust instrument so that the ultimate
beneficiaries, usually the remaindermen, would have a cause of
action against the settlor-trustee should he deal with the corpus in
a manner inconsistent with the terms of the trust instrument, this
will satisfy the requirement that the settlor part with property
rights. 5 The quantum of control retained by the settlor is con-
sidered incidental, since by reserving a general power of revocation
the settlor would possess identical control. Where a right of revoca-
tion is retained a settlor can always revoke the entire trust if he is
unsatisfied with the administration of the trustee or his benefits
under it. 6
When the issue is raised that the reservation of all controls over
the trust by the settlor until his death makes the trust a substitute
for a will and therefore invalid, the majority of courts have held
that the trust will not be considered testamentary unless the death
of the settlor is a condition precedent to the vesting of the bene-
ficiaries' interests. 7 The fact that enjoyment is dependent upon
survivorship will not render the trust testamentary. 8 Furthermore,
as a rule of construction the courts will construe a condition in the
trust instrument as subsequent rather than precedent because of the
preference in favor of vested interests. 9
In some cases trusts containing extensive powers of management
and invasion of corpus have failed, but this would seem to occur
only where the surviving spouse in challenging the trust has pleaded
and proved actual fraud in regard to the marital rights,2" or the
transfer was illusory."1 In the absence of actual fraud, and where
Is Farkas v. Williams, 5 1ll.2d 417, 125 N.E.2d 600 (1955); Smyth v.
Cleveland Trust Co., 172 Ohio St. 489, 179 N.E.2d 60 (1961) (corporate
trustee not mere agent).16 Roberts v. Roberts, 286 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1961).1
7 Smyth v. Cleveland Trust Co., 172 Ohio St. 489, 179 N. E.2d 60
(1961); Alexander v. Zion Bank, 4 U.2d 90, 287 P.2d 665 (1955) (express
condition of survivorship).18 Smyth v. Cleveland Trust Co., 172 Ohio St. 489, 179 N.E.2d 60 (1961).
,9 United Building and Loan Ass'n v. Garrett, 64 F.Supp. 460 (W.D.
Ark. 1945).20 In Re Montague's Estate, 403 Pa. 558, 170 A.2d 103 (1961); 51
Nw. U.L. Rev. 113 (1956).
21 Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E. 2d 966 (1937); Matter of
Halpem, 303 N.Y. 33, 100 N.E.2d 120 (1951).
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the cestui has received a vested interest at the time the trust was
created, a settlor may retain broad powers over the trust without
rendering the transfer illusory or testamentary."a
Judith Herndon
2 2 Buret v. First Nat1 Bank, 12 Ill. App.2d 514, 140 N.E.2d 362 (1957);
State v. Felton, 172 Ohio St. 540, 179 N.E.2d 60 (1961); Ridge v. Bright, 244
N.C. 345, 93 S.E.2d 607 (1956).
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